India
The Indian military includes army, naval, and air forces. Instead of discussing religion across the Indian military, this chapter confines its focus to the army. There are three reasons for this choice. First, the army is the largest component of the Indian armed forces. Second, it has been the most widely used and consequential arm of the military during all domestic and international military operations. Third, many of the practices described are not restricted to the army but rather are common to the other branches of service.
This chapter draws on field research and interviews conducted between December 2009 and January 2011 in addition to incorporating materials from secondary sources. I do not reveal the names, regiments, and locations of officers and soldiers unless they have already appeared in public elsewhere. I conducted a total of 174 interviews with retired and serving officers and soldiers across six states in India. These individuals belonged to four infantry and two support regiments. Overall, I interviewed 45 officers and 129 soldiers from other ranks.
The chapter begins by describing how the army engages religion, then outlines two challenges it poses for the institution. The next section enumerates the institutional mechanisms put in place to cope with these challenges. The final two sections illustrate these mechanisms during an army operation in a religious shrine and evaluate their efficacy during the subsequent mutiny among soldiers triggered by the events surrounding the operation.
Religion in the Indian Military
India is one of the most religiously diverse countries in the world and is home to Hindus (80.5 percent), Muslims (13.4 percent), Christians (2.3 percent), Sikhs (1.9 percent), Buddhists (0.8 percent) , and Jains (0.4 percent).
ii Moreover, Indian society is religious. In the 2009 Indian National Election Study, 74 percent of respondents reported praying weekly, and 54 percent reported attending a place of worship weekly. Among my interview subjects, 88 percent were comfortable describing themselves as "religious."
iii Today, the Indian Army has a volunteer force of more than 1.15 million active personnel recruited from this diverse and religiously observant environment. iv It is difficult to obtain precise figures on the religious composition of the army; the army does not provide these data. Officers call on these teachers to give inspiring sermons and reassuring advice ahead of operations. Finally, weapons themselves are worshipped through certain rites.
Accommodating religion through state policies further entrenches the power of religion.
x That said, religiosity is a defining feature of the lived experience of many soldiers. The challenge for a professional army, therefore, is to acknowledge this reality and to harness the benefits religion has to offer while still limiting its pernicious effects.
The accommodation of religion and its instrumental use pose two challenges for the army: (1) subordinating religious authority to military authority, and (2) maintaining unit cohesion. These are explained in the next two sections. Officers understand the management of religion is not as simple as establishing rules and commanding they be followed. In practice, subordinating religious authority to military authority can be difficult, especially during periods of communal violence, and is an ongoing process. A major general heading a division explained, "Suspicions of loyalty do arise, even among officers, especially when things are difficult in the country like they were around the Babri Masjid demolition and Operation Blue Star. It is not possible for the soldiers and officers to shut the world out completely in this day and age." xiv A majority of officers interviewed agreed with this view. At the same time, they felt the army had the means to reinforce its claim to the soldiers' loyalty over rival claims.
Two Competing Authorities
Another brigade commander pointed out, "Life in the army is tough and people, irrespective of their faith, caste, or regional identity, go through these experiences together. This shared experience binds us. The honor of our regiments and our fellow men is at stake." xv Officers and soldiers alike adopt the distinct codes and practices of a regiment.
The regimental history, traditions, mottoes, insignias, and awards are used to immerse personnel in the regimental identity. Long tenures of duty with the battalion of the regiment cement this identity over time. The adoption of the regimental identity helps establish the army's authority over the other allegiances of the soldiers. By grounding the idea of honor in regimental identity, the army undercuts the hold of faith on soldiers. 
Internal Cohesion
Managing diversity while retaining an effective fighting force has been a long-standing challenge for Indian armies. It is important to point out that in India, identity politicsreligious and ethnic -remains one of the key motifs of democratic politics. The army exists within an environment where religious and ethnic conflict is commonplace, and the state regularly turns to the army to enforce law and order during communal riots and to conduct counterinsurgency operations. The army therefore needs effective mechanisms to remain apolitical and maintain cohesion.
Religion presents the military with two possible challenges related to internal cohesion. First, religious bonding potentially provides both the issue and the resources for mutiny. After all, it is easier to politicize religion among collectives in which soldiers already share religious beliefs. A sense of group solidarity, it has long been feared, could enable group rebellion. Second, recognition of the salience of religion poses the danger of interreligious conflict within a multifaith army. For example, the religious cleavages common to the society could easily be imported into the military, causing it to rupture as has been the case in Bosnia, Lebanon, and Nigeria.
Because the army draws from and operates in a multifaith society, it must enjoy the support of the population. More important, to maintain force cohesion, it must have in place mechanisms that will allow it to manage religious diversity effectively and maintain interfaith harmony. The following section identifies four institutional mechanisms: (1) institutionalization of interfaith respect, (2) an apolitical organization, (3) selection of ethnicity as an organization principle, and (4) elite control. Together these are used to ensure the primacy of organizational authority and contain religiously motivated conflict within the army.
Four Institutional Mechanisms
The literature on ethnic and religious conflict suggests that institutional design matters for controlling violence. It points to a variety of institutional mechanisms that can variably exacerbate or reduce the prospects for conflict. xvii These range from electoral rules to power-sharing arrangements. States sometimes consciously select institutional designs that lower the probability of conflict. In other cases, conflict containment is an unintended consequence of institutional design. In either case, institutions are implicated in producing peace and preventing and containing violence. The Indian military also turns to institutional mechanisms to meet its faith-related challenges. The modern Indian Army imbibed the concern over the politicization of religion in the military from its parent institution -the British colonial army. xviii From it, the Indian Army also inherited some of the institutional mechanisms to address these concerns.
xix
Institutionalization of Interfaith Respect
In keeping with its secular approach, the army insists on interfaith respect. Criticism of faiths or religious practices is viewed as detrimental to troop discipline and is punished.
More important, the large numbers of religious teachers recruited into the army are required to undergo a yearlong training program together at the Institute for National
Integration, irrespective of their faith. The program is directed at making the religious teachers aware of the need for religious harmony and fostering a spirit of cooperation.
These religious teachers are required to abide by army rules at all times and to adhere to the same command structure as other soldiers.
The army is very particular about presenting itself as a national institution, and respect for all faiths is a fundamental tenet of this image. The army, for example, celebrates men belonging to different faiths among its heroes, including the winners of gallantry awards. In the schools that it runs for the children of soldiers and officerseffectively catchment areas -prayers from multiple faiths are drawn on during school assemblies. Despite relying on religion to motivate soldiers during battle, the Indian Army does not define the enemy in religious terms because doing so would prove counterproductive for a mixed-faith force. In interviews with 126 soldiers belonging to different regiments that took part in operations during the Kargil conflict in 1998, 67 percent of soldiers talking about the Pakistani forces used terms such as dushman 
An Apolitical Organization
Traditionally, the army has remained apolitical. It has not demonstrated any inclination toward interfering in politics and has resented attempts by politicians to interfere in its internal affairs. xxi As a result, it takes an adverse view of serving officers who express political views or associate with political or social outfits, especially those that have religious leanings. This again is a legacy of the British colonial army which, fearing the influence of nationalist politicians and sporadic religious strife, turned distance from politics into a virtue for a soldier.
Similar fears and a desire to preserve its isolation continue to make the Indian Army into an apolitical organization. It maintains its distance from political parties, does not comment on political issues, and does not allow political parties or leaders to campaign before its personnel on military bases. xxii The appearance of these guidelines being violated draws a sharp response from inside and outside the army. The army also resists regular political demands in the matters of recruitment from a particular ethnic or religious community or the creation of new ethnic regiments.
Selection of Ethnicity as an Organizational Principle
At the national level, religion, in India, makes a claim on a larger community than ethnicity. Hence, the politicization of religion potentially poses a greater threat to the army than the politicization of ethnicity. In multiethnic and multifaith societies, the social cleavage structure can take two possible forms. It can be cumulative, where the different cleavages reinforce each other, or it can be crosscutting, where people united by one attribute could be divided by another. When cleavages cumulate, the fault lines run deeper, and a master or central cleavage can often divide societies. When cleavages crosscut, differences do not reinforce each other, and it becomes difficult for a master cleavage to emerge.
Indian society is characterized by crosscutting cleavages. As a result, where a common religious identity can potentially unite a people, their ethnic differencesunderstood as regional, linguistic, and caste differences -can potentially divide.
xxiii Through its organizational design, the army harnesses the cleavage structure to act as the first line of defense against a small, faith-based mutiny turning into a large-scale revolt.
One of the lessons British commanders drew from the Sepoy Mutiny of 1857 was that religion could be a potent trigger for revolts and had to be managed carefully.
xxiv Similarly, ethnic, religious, and cultural sensitivities had to be accommodated. Another was that when the loyalty of a group broke down and the group rebelled, other ethnic groups could be used to subdue it. xxv There has been a long-standing predisposition in India toward organizing the army ethnically.
The colonial army followed a martial race theory for recruiting soldiers.
According to this idea, some groups were especially well suited to soldiering because of their physical and cultural attributes. This system has been discontinued. Under this arrangement, the emphasis on ethnicity undermines the significance of faith. So, for example, even though the Rajputana Rifles, the Gurkhas, and the Jat regiments share the same faith -they are mostly Hindus -each one of these groups has an ethnically rooted, distinct regimental identity. The formation structures through which the soldiers of a particular regiment are deployed further limit the possibility of internal conflict. These structures disperse them into smaller groups, making containment of religiously or ethnically motivated group action easier.
Although regiments can be homogeneous or mixed, army formations are always mixed during times of both peace and conflict. A brigade formation typically brings together battalions from different regiments. Thus, even if a battalion is ethnically homogeneous, at the brigade level it may serve with other battalions composed of soldiers from other ethnic groups. This arrangement also ensures that any identitymotivated conflict within a company or a battalion can be easily isolated. Because the army draws from multiple ethnic groups, and emphasizes ethnicity in its organizational setup, any force-wide rebellion would have to overcome the significant challenge of cross-group coordination. This arrangement then allows the army to use forces belonging to different ethnic groups to quell any mutiny within a particular formation. In this way, using a largely ethnicity-centered organizational principle, the army defends itself from religiously and ethnicity-motivated internal conflict.
Elite Control
On the whole, the army relies on a professional and well-trained officer class for the success of the mechanisms it has put in place to maintain cohesion. In this sense, these mechanisms remain primarily elite-centric, with their efficacy dependent on the quality of
officers. An officer is expected to adopt a paternal relationship with his men. The officers usually belong to a higher socioeconomic class and are better educated than the soldiers they command. Although among themselves officers converse in English, they converse with their men in the regional languages of their units or in Hindi. This social distance is also maintained through the segregation of dining and recreational facilities for the officers and soldiers. The efficacy of institutions is tested in moments of crisis. Next, I draw on the Indian Army's experience in one such crisis to illustrate how the mechanisms outlined here fared during a period of stress. The following discussion illustrates the conflict between the desire to accommodate religious sensitivities and the need for operational success, and how in one instance the army set aside religious considerations to meet its objectives. Prior to and during Operation Blue Star, the army took steps to demonstrate its respect for Sikh religious sentiments. As the operation progressed, however, some of these were set aside.
To begin, a Sikh officer, Maj. Gen. K. S. Brar, was chosen to lead Operation Blue Star.
Although no exclusively Sikh battalion participated in the operation, Sikh officers and soldiers participated as members of mixed battalions. The operation was made voluntary, and soldiers of all four of the participating battalions were given the option to opt out on religious grounds; few did, however.
xxxi According to Gen. Brar's account of the operation plan, soldiers were instructed to use light weapons to avoid damage to key structures inside the temple complex, especially the Harmandir Sahib (the central sanctuary); pilgrims were to be separated from the militants and brought out safely; all troops taking part in the operation were to uphold the religious sanctity of the temple; and their personal behavior and conduct were to be unimpeachable.
The operation began at dusk on June 5, 1984. The planners were eager to accomplish their task before dawn, after which they believed soldiers would find it difficult to move in the complex without the cover of darkness. The army also feared that a protracted struggle could encourage an uprising in rural Punjab, where there was support for the separatists and their charismatic leader, Jarnail Singh Bhindranwale.
xxxii
The separatists' group was headquartered in the Akal Takht, the second holiest structure in the complex and the seat of Sikh religious authority. This initially ruled out the use of heavy weapons during the assault. Multiple assaults on the Akal Takht by commando teams using CS gas -a stunning agent -were all repelled. The structure was well fortified, and without good intelligence, it seemed impossible to access it. As dawn approached and army casualties mounted, the army decided to use tanks to end the resistance. In the process, the Akal Takht suffered extensive damage.
xxxiii After the operation, when the army gained entry into the Harmandir Sahib, care
was taken so that Sikh soldiers entered the shrine first. With the assistance of army granthis, the recitation of prayers was resumed in Harmandir Sahib within forty-eight hours after the operation commenced. xxxiv In its statements, the army insisted it had gone to great lengths to preserve the sanctity of the Golden Temple complex in keeping with its respect for the Sikh faith. Recounting his experience, Gen. Brar wrote, "In order to fight a battle righteously, there is no doubt that the army paid a heavy price in terms of casualties, and its soldiers never disobeyed the orders given to them, despite extreme provocation." xxxv Speaking to journalists, the officer commanding troops in all of Punjab during the operation, Lt. Gen. Dayal, himself a Sikh, said, "As all of you know, the Indian army is a very religious army. Once the orders are given to them they follow them to the letter and once it was told to them [not to damage the Golden Temple] I was sure they will obey this and I am proud to say they did until the end." xxxvi Lt. Gen. Sunderji, the man who oversaw the entire mobilization as the area commander of the Western Command under which the state of Punjab falls, said, "We went inside with humility in our hearts and prayers on our lips. We in the army hold all places of religion in equal reverence." xxxvii With the aim of accommodating religious sensitivities, the army chose a Sikh commander to lead Operation Blue Star, Sikh soldiers were given the option to remove themselves from the operation, instructions were given to keep the Harmandir Sahib out of the line of fire, and heavy weapons were not deployed in the early stages of the operation. Only when soldiers failed to enter the Akal Takht after repeated attempts and when casualties mounted, did the army seek permission from the prime minister's office to use tank fire in the temple complex. One retired officer who was closely connected with the operation recounted the dilemma for me. He said, "All hell had broken out. …
We had bad intelligence. … We had taken heavy casualties on the Parikrama. … After losing so many men, there could be no turning back. Had we done that, it would have been a disaster for the morale. So we used tanks against the Akal Takht, which was also a disaster." The cantonment revolts highlighted the difficulty of isolating the military as an institution from the social and political upheavals occurring around it. It was discovered that separatists had managed to influence some army units. As a result, soldiers had provided the separatists with financial, emotional, and material support in the form of weapons. There were close to a dozen instances of revolts spread over multiple locations.
The mutinies seem to represent a failure of the army's institutional mechanisms.
On the whole, however, these measures prevented a catastrophe from unfolding. Only 2,000 men, or 3 percent of the Sikh soldiers serving in the army, participated in the mutinies. In the most sensational case, in which around 1,400 soldiers deserted after killing their commanding officer and arming themselves, a significant number of the participants were found to be new recruits unschooled in regimental traditions, and who, as a result, were incited easily or, in some instances, were forced to participate at gunpoint. None of the Sikh battalions stationed close to the shrine revolted. And, perhaps most important, no serving Sikh officer joined the mutiny. For a large part of the army, the fallout remained limited. The mechanisms it had in place to deal with such a contingency, as I argue in the following section, curtailed the incidence of mutiny and its spread.
Ethnic Organization
Among Sikhs, religious identity is reinforced by a territorial identity because most Sikhs originate from the Punjab. Sikh grievances centered on both regional and religious issues, making them potent for use. And yet, the decision to participate in the mutiny reflected caste differences. Higher-caste Jat Sikhs join different regiments from lower-caste Mazhabi Sikhs. Despite a common grievance related to the desecration of their holiest site, the mutinies occurred mostly in the Jat Sikh battalions from the Sikh and Punjab regiments. Battalions from the Sikh Light Infantry -the regiment of the Mazhabi Sikhsdid not participate. Where mutinies occurred, help was often at hand because of the mixed nature of the formations. Soldiers from the adjoining non-Sikh battalions were used to disarm and round up the mutineers. New recruits at the regimental center were found to be most easily incited. They had yet to be socialized into the traditions of their units and failed to grasp the stigma their actions would impose on their regiment.
Elite Command
As noted earlier, the efficacy of the institutional mechanisms turns on the quality of leadership shown by the officers. In its official and unofficial assessments of the factors responsible for the revolts, the army assigned blame to its officers. For the army, a mutiny was symptomatic of a broken officer-soldier relationship. In some instances, assessments suggested that officers had failed to communicate with their soldiers and had not preempted their potential for incitement. They also found that officers had failed to check the influence of religious preachers who were advocating for the Sikh militants inside army cantonments. These situations marked a failure of the officer-centric elite command structure.
According to comments appearing in the Indian press, retired officers -even those who disagreed with the government's policy to send the army into the templeconcurred with this official view. Lt. Gen. Harbaksh Singh said, "They thought their villages were being attacked when they heard the announcement that the army was being and then interviewed those who were willing to discuss their experiences. Among those identified and interviewed, five officers played a pivotal role in calming passions and reassuring troops. When asked why his troops listened to him, one officer explained, "They had respect for me. I had been there for them. That night, if my men did not trust me, they would have shot me. They were very angry. They had been hearing all types of stories about what was going on in their villages." Another officer, recounting a nightlong conversation with his troops, said, "I was like a parent, sometimes I had to shout at them, while at other times I had to be gentle with them." xliii Officers also said that, in trying to calm the passions of their soldiers, they appealed to their regimental and battalion identity and its honor, telling their soldiers that if they revolted, their units would be dishonored forever.
xliv Ethnic organization and elite control mechanisms were not sufficient to prevent a mutiny among all Sikh battalions during a politically charged period. At the same time, these measures were able to limit the damage in instances where the soldiers revolted.
Caste divisions among Sikhs and the mixed-deployment model prevented the mutiny from spreading across all the Sikh battalions. The army turned to its elite command structure as the primary bulwark against the widespread breakdown of discipline. Where mutinies occurred, fault was found with the army's command structure. xlv Although some retired Sikh officers openly backed the militants, no serving officer joined them. A few senior Sikh bureaucrats resigned to protest Operation Blue Star, but no Sikh officer resigned in protest. Under remarkable stress, the army strived to remain apolitical throughout the conflict; it deferred the decision to increase force to the prime minister's office. Soldiers followed norms of interfaith respect. Sikh soldiers were not attacked by non-Sikhs, and mutinying Sikh soldiers did not turn on soldiers of other faiths stationed in their vicinity. When investigations revealed that in a few instances Sikh granthis had played a role in instigating troops to rebel after Operation Blue Star, the army acted swiftly and in 1985 set up the Institute for National Integration, a school for training all religious teachers who join the armed forces.
The two parts of the case study illustrate the religion-related challenges the Indian Army faces and the four institutional mechanisms it relies on to meet them. The army has been deployed regularly for internal security duties within India and suffered very high numbers of casualties in the process. The conflicts it is involved in have implications for its internal cohesion, organizational discipline, and the support it enjoys among the civilian population.
Conclusion
According to conventional wisdom, the organization of militaries should be driven by the objective of projecting maximum military power during battle. Militaries are not perpetually engaged in fighting wars with other states, however. They are often called on to perform duties related to internal security or to assist with state administration.
Officers and soldiers alike have to live and train while still being a part of society. In multiethnic and multireligious societies, militaries are exposed to the social conflicts that surround them. Militaries can build barriers to shield themselves from these pressures, but an active role in the preservation of internal security can make them vulnerable to social conflicts. Therefore, they must strive to ensure self-preservation. As organizations, militaries also have an institutional memory informed by their experiences.
The modern Indian Army inherited from its colonial predecessor the fear of internal conflict and a concern for its own preservation while existing in a society prone to religious and ethnic volatility. Because religion could not be separated from the soldiers recruited into the force, it was accommodated and, where possible, harnessed to provide motivation and comfort. The army has continued to use and refine the institutional mechanisms it inherited to contain the danger religion poses to the organization. Even as it has repeatedly been assigned internal security responsibilities, it has accepted these reluctantly. Given the political backdrop against which it operates, and the internal security-related responsibilities it is instructed to discharge, it is faced with the constant danger of being influenced by the politicization of religion in Indian society.
Today, from Iraq to Afghanistan, constructing national armies remains a challenge for multinational states. The experience of the Indian Army offers important policy lessons for managing issues related to religious and ethnic diversity. The Indian
Army recruits from a society with a history of identity conflict and political violence. As a result, it has had to develop mechanisms to manage diversity; these should be instructive for other multireligious and multiethnic militaries. 
